Dvdplay Funding — Validated & Newest
| Round | Year | Amount | Lead Investor | Notable Terms | Outcome | |-------|------|--------|---------------|----------------|---------| | Series A | 2006 | $4.5M | Voyager Capital | Full ratchet, board seat | Burned for expansion | | Mezzanine debt | 2008 | $3.0M | Wellington Financial | 14.5% interest, convertible | Defaulted | | Studio rev-share | 2008 | $2.0M (imputed) | Lionsgate/Warner | 15% of revenue | Raised COGS to 47% | | Series B | 2009 | $12.0M | Oak Investment | 2x liquidation pref, pay-to-play | Lost on streaming pivot | | Convertible notes | 2011 | $2.5M | Portland angels | 20% discount, $0.25 floor | Converted to zero | | | | $24.0M | | | Recovery: $3.1M |
Note: Figures adjusted for inflation and based on Oregon Secretary of State filings, SEC Form D notices, and bankruptcy docket #12-00321 (District of Oregon). dvdplay funding
Then came Redbox. In late 2005, Redbox—then a joint venture between McDonald’s Ventures and Coinstar—rolled out 800 kiosks nationwide, pricing rentals at $1.00, undercutting DVDPlay’s $1.50. Overnight, Phillips’ bootstrapped model became unsustainable. He needed scale. He needed funding. | Round | Year | Amount | Lead
DVDPlay’s story is not one of technology or consumer habit. It is a story of —of desperate rounds, convertible notes, and the brutal math that happens when you try to out-spend a giant selling dollar bills for ninety cents. This is the anatomy of a capital war. Act I: The Bootstrap Years (2002–2005) Long before the kiosk wars, DVDPlay was the side project of Mark and Sharon Phillips, two serial entrepreneurs who had made a small fortune in the Oregon wine distribution business. Their first machine—a clunky, beige box that held 300 discs and required a customer to swipe a credit card and manually return the DVD to a slot—was funded with $80,000 of their own savings. DVDPlay’s story is not one of technology or consumer habit
Enter , a Seattle-based VC firm focused on digital media. In February 2006, DVDPlay closed a $4.5 million Series A . The term sheet was brutal: 8% preferred liquidation preference, a full ratchet anti-dilution clause, and a board seat for Voyager’s managing director.
